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will involve political trade-offs, as well as technical problems. It
is a difficult process, but we were, and remain, in a difficult
spot. We are going to be dealing with the financial crisis politically-and our leaders will be dealing with it-for years to
come.
III.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE CASE FOR A MARKET LIQUIDITY
PROVIDER OF LAST RESORT**

STEVEN L. ScHwARcz***

A.

Introduction

The real economy-meaning the way the economy personally affects us all-relies critically on credit. The current
financial crisis, it has been observed, began in the credit markets, and eventually will end there. Diminished credit harms
the real economy because firms need credit to operate and
grow and individuals need credit to buy homes, cars, and
other consumer goods.
Many think that the story of the credit crunch fundamentally is a banking story. Yes, there is now a severe lack of confidence in banks; but the credit crunch predated and contributed to this lack of confidence-although the lack of confidence, in turn, is now making the credit crunch worse.
Let me tell the story from the beginning. The credit
crunch started with the collapse of the securitization and other
debt markets. Securitization is a process whereby consumer financial assets (like mortgage loans, credit card receivables,
and automobile loans) and corporate financial assets (like accounts receivable, lease rentals, and licensing fees) are financed through the issuance of debt securities backed by the
financial assets. These securities-the most recognizable these
days being securities backed by mortgage loans or "mortgagebacked securities"-are sold to institutional investors in both
U.S. and worldwide capital markets. I loosely will refer to capital markets in which securitization and other debt securities
are issued and traded as securitization markets.
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Increasingly, corporate and consumer financing is
originated not from banks per se or from bank deposits but
from the securitization markets, whose investors may include
banks. This shift-known as "disintermediation," removing
banks as intermediaries of funds'-can be very efficient. By
removing the middleman, it removes the middleman's (that is,
the bank's) profit mark-up. Think of it like buying wholesale,
or even directly from the manufacturer.
When the securitization markets collapsed, however, companies and consumers were deprived of this major source of
credit financing. Companies had difficulty borrowing and
could not purchase inventory and make capital investments.
Consumers had difficulty borrowing and could not purchase
homes and automobiles. The lack of credit very directly impacted the real economy.
There are now two fundamental questions: Why did the
securitization markets collapse, and how should they be protected?
The answer to the first question is that the securitization
markets collapsed due to a systemic cascade of failures initially
triggered by the historically unanticipated depth of the fall in
housing prices. Mortgage loans to risky borrowers were often
made with the expectation of refinancing through home appreciation. When home prices stopped appreciating, these
borrowers could not refinance. In many cases, they defaulted.
These "subprime" loan defaults, in turn, caused substantial amounts of low-investment-grade-rated mortgage-backed
securities to default and AAA-rated securities to be downgraded. The defaults were especially large for so-called ABS
CDO securities-a class of securities backed indirectly by subprime mortgages and other assets-because of the leveraged
sensitivity of these securities to underlying mortgage defaults.
That, in turn, spooked investors who believed that "AAA"
meant iron-clad safety and that "investment grade" meant relative freedom from default. Investors started losing confidence
in ratings and avoiding securitization and other debt securities. Fewer investors meant that the price of these securities
started falling. Falling prices meant that firms using these securities as collateral had to mark them to market and put up
1. Although, as indicated, a bank may act as an ultimate investor.
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cash, requiring the sale of more securities, which caused market prices to plummet further downward in a death spiral. This
death spiral appears to have been made worse by the high leverage of many firms. Encouraged by the earlier liquidity glut,
many firms had borrowed excessively because the cost of funds
was so cheap.
The refusal in mid-September of the government to save
Lehman Brothers, and Lehman's resulting bankruptcy, added
to this cascade. Securitization markets became so spooked that
even the highly-conservative asset-backed commercial paper
segment virtually shut down. And the market prices of mortgage-backed securities collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value-essentially the present value of the expected value
of the underlying cash flows-of the mortgage loans backing
those securities.
This collapse in market prices meant that banks and other
financial institutions holding mortgage-backed securities had
to write down their value. That caused these institutions to appear more financially risky, in turn triggering concern over
counterparty risk: afraid these institutions might default on
their contractual obligations, many parties stopped dealing
with them. This counterparty risk and concern over bank-asset
values is what has caused the lack of confidence in banks. This
lack of confidence is thus a consequence, not the cause, of the collapse in market prices.
The media and many economists and other scholars,
though, have focused too narrowly, I think, on banks. History
and law help to explain this narrow focus. From an historical
perspective, bank runs are the most visible symbol of the Great
Depression. From a legal perspective, the Federal Reserve
spearheaded U.S. government actions over the past year to address the spreading financial crisis. But the Federal Reserve's
mission is historically limited, under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, to act as a lender of last resort in "unusual
and exigent circumstances" to banks and other financial institutions.
Such a narrow focus worked well when banks were the primary source of consumer and company financing. But as the
current financial crisis reveals, disintermediation makes this
narrow focus insufficient. Greater attention needs to be paid
to the securitization markets. We would not today be facing a
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lack of confidence in banks if their mortgage-backed and
other investment securities had maintained market value reasonably corresponding to their intrinsic value.
Let's focus now on the second question: How should
these markets be protected? This question has two aspects:
First, should securitization markets be protected? Second, if
they should be protected, how should that occur?
I believe that securitization markets should be protected.
In a separate paper, I have argued that securitization efficiently allocates risk with capital. It enables companies to access capital markets directly, in most cases at lower cost than
the cost of issuing direct debt (such as bonds or commercial
paper). It avoids middleman inefficiencies. It also helps to
transform financial assets, such as loans, into cash for new extensions of credit. These positives might be outweighed, however, by securitization's negatives revealed by the subprime crisis. There are several potential negatives: for example, the
originate-to-distribute model of securitization might create
moral hazard; securitization can create servicing conflicts; and
securitization can foster overreliance on mathematical models.
Balancing these benefits and costs, I conclude that, properly utilized, securitization is an efficient financial tool. Proper
utilization should include, for example, refocusing on basic
structures and asset types in order to attract investors; emphasizing cash-flow securitizations in which there are the traditional "two-ways out"; and avoiding highly complex securitization products like ABS CDO transactions which magnify leverage. My view is shared by leading economists, such as Yale's
Professor Gary Gorton who concludes:
There are no such issues [as occurred in the subprime crisis] with securitization generally, or with the
use of off-balance sheet vehicles for the securitization
of [other than subprime mortgage loan] asset classes.
Other securitizations are not so sensitive to the prices
of the underlying assets and so they are not so susceptible to bubbles.
The abuse of securitization may have contributed to this
financial mess, but, by regenerating credit, securitization can
also help to get us out of it.
Let's turn now to the second aspect of the question: How
should securitization markets be protected? Securitization
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markets are already subject to many prescriptive regulatory
protections, and more are likely to be imposed in the future in
response to the current financial crisis. History, however, has
shown that financial markets evolve faster than regulation can
adapt. I have recently argued, based on lessons of the current
crisis, that modern financial regulatory reforms should be focused on three categories of market failures-conflicts, complacency, and complexity-as well as on a possible fourth category: a type of tragedy of the commons that also can give rise
to systemic financial market failures. It is, however, impossible
to know precisely how future financial crises will arise. Prescriptive regulation, therefore, cannot always prevent these crises. We need a fallback protection for when prescriptive regulation inevitably fails.
I propose a broad fallback protection: a market liquidity
provider of last resort. A market liquidity provider can provide
protection by helping to stabilize irrationally panicked financial markets-such as securitization markets in which the price
of securities is falling significantly below their intrinsic valuethereby averting a downward price spiral that could trigger a
systemic cascade.
Ideal markets would not need a market liquidity provider
of last resort. If financial securities are underpriced, investors
will step in immediately to buy them. Real markets, however,
do not always work this way. In a panicked market, for example, private investors may not act rationally-as the current financial crisis has shown. Individuals at investing firms also may
not want to jeopardize their reputations (and jobs) by causing
their firms to invest at a time when other investors have abandoned the market. Furthermore, private institutional investors
usually want to buy and sell securities, not waiting for their
maturities. In times of falling prices and market uncertainty,
an investor may not want to risk having to wait until maturity
of the securities to profit.2 A market liquidity provider should
be designed to be able to wait, if necessary, until maturity.
2. Furthermore, private investors face the risk that a continuing fall in
market prices could systemically impact the real economy (such as by shutting down credit markets, as occurred in the subprime crisis), thereby jeopardizing even the intrinsic value of their purchased securities. A market liquidity provider, in contrast, should have the ability to invest sufficiently
large amounts to stabilize markets.
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Envisioning How a Market Liquidity Provider Could Work

A market liquidity provider would likely need to be a governmental entity in order to have access to governmental
funding. I contemplate that the market-liquidity-provider function may need to be performed domestically, in the U.S. and
other countries, as well as on an international level. I will not
in this short time remaining get into possible organizational
details.
I am, however, contemplating action by the market liquidity provider only when, as might occur in an irrationally panicked market, the market price of securities is falling significantly below their intrinsic value. In the case of asset-backed
securities, for example, intrinsic value would be determined by
present valuing an estimate of the expected value of cash flows
from obligors on the financial assets backing these securities.
In an irrationally panicked market, the market liquidity
provider would have at least two options. It could choose to
purchase market securities, at a price deeply discounted from
the original market price and also lower than the intrinsic
value of the securities purchased but still high enough to stabilize market prices above the panicked free-fall level. Alternatively, it could attempt to stabilize the market by entering into
derivative contracts to strip out the elements that the market
has the greatest difficulty hedging-in effect, the market's irrationality element-thereby stimulating private investment.
The Obama Administration presently appears to be considering this latter type of public-private partnership approach in its
revised financial bailout plan, which envisions private investors
buying distressed mortgage-backed securities, with the government guaranteeing a floor value to the securities purchased.
By not actually purchasing securities directly, the market liquidity provider would appear to be taking less investment
risk, and thus its function may be seen as more politically acceptable.
These types of targeted market investments should generate relatively minimal costs, and certainly lower costs than
those of a lender of last resort to financial institutions-the
Federal Reserve Bank's traditional role. By providing a lifeline
to financial institutions, a lender of last resort can foster
"moral hazard" by encouraging these entities-especially
those that believe they are "too big to fail"-to be fiscally reck-
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less. These loans will also not be repaid if the institution eventually fails.
In contrast, a market liquidity provider, especially if it acts at
the outset of a market panic, can profitably invest in securities at a
deep discount from the original market price and still provide
a "floor" to how low the market will drop. Buying at a deep
discount will mitigate investor moral hazard and also make it
likely that the market liquidity provider will be repaid. Furthermore, by focusing on markets, a market liquidity provider can
avoid the too-big-to-fail dilemma of a lender of last resort to
institutions. In economic terms, therefore, any safety-net subsidies created by a marker liquidity provider of last resort will be
much smaller than those created by a lender of last resort.
How might this work in the current financial crisis? Say
the intrinsic price of a type of mortgage-backed securities, calculated by taking the present value of the expected value of
the cash flows on the mortgage loans backing those securities,
is 80 cents on the dollar. If the market price of those securities
had fallen to, say, 20 cents on the dollar, the market liquidity
provider could purchase these securities at, say, 60 cents on
the dollar, thereby stabilizing the market and still making a
profit.
There are potential obstacles to these purchases. Again
using the current financial crisis as an example, many mortgage-backed securities are held by financial institutions. Many
of these institutions will not want to sell their securities if they
have to mark down value on their financial statements. Furthermore, even if a given institution does not sell, mark-tomarket accounting may require the institution to mark its securities down to market prices set by the market liquidity provider in its other purchases.
I believe, however, that the same flexible pricing approach used in structured financing transactions to purchase
financial assets of uncertain value could be used to overcome
these obstacles-such as the market liquidity provider agreeing to pay a higher "deferred purchase price" for securities
that turn out to be worth more than expected.
Finally, contrast my market-liquidity-provider concept
with the approaches over the past year of the Bush and Obama
administrations. I had proposed the market-liquidity-provider
concept to Congress over a year ago.
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The U.S. Treasury Department's proposal in early Fall
2008 to use government money to purchase mortgage-backed
securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was the first
attempt by government to stabilize markets by purchasing securities. As a result of these purchases, the national average 30year fixed mortgage rate fell significantly, setting off a huge
refinancing boom. And on Wednesday, February 18, 2009 the
Obama White House announced, as part of its Homeowner
Affordability and Stability Plan, that "the Treasury Department
will continue to purchase Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities to promote stability and liquidity in the
marketplace." These purchases, however, do not address the
much larger problem of mortgage-backed securities that are
not already effectively government-guaranteed.
The original TARP plan also contemplated government
purchases of mortgage-backed securities, although primarily
for minimizing financial-institution counterparty risk and only
secondarily for stabilizing market prices. Unfortunately, Bush
administration officials ultimately used the TARP money to
purchase priority equity interests in troubled financial institutions. Those purchases did little, however, to stabilize market
prices of the securities or to revitalize securitization markets.
The more recent Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF, also contemplates investing government funds
in certain consumer-asset-backed securities to reduce consumer financing costs. Its results are not yet known.
Also, as I mentioned, the Obama Administration presently appears to be considering a public-private partnership
approach with government hedging.
These approaches are good beginnings; but they might be
too little, too late. By waiting so long, it has become harder to
stabilize markets because of the systemic impact of the credit
crunch. The real economy is shrinking and individuals are losing their jobs, making it more likely that obligors on assets
backing even prime securities will default. I hope we will make
the commitment of funds needed-the extent of which will
ultimately be driven by the market response.
Finally, I urge that the concept of a market liquidity provider be institutionalized to backstop any future prescriptive
regulatory schemes. Stabilization is much easier to achieve at
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the outset of a market panic, before the panic becomes a selffulfilling prophecy, cutting off credit and cratering the real
economy.
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